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Visual streamLanguage is more than a source of information for accessing higher-order conceptual
knowledge. Indeed, language may determine how people perceive and interpret visual
stimuli. Visual processing in linguistic contexts, for instance, mirrors language processing
and happens incrementally, rather than through variously-oriented ﬁxations over a partic-
ular scene. The consequences of this atypical visual processing are yet to be determined.
Here, we investigated the integration of visual and linguistic input during a reasoning task.
Participants listened to sentences containing conjunctions or disjunctions (Nancy examined
an ant and/or a cloud) and looked at visual scenes containing two pictures that either
matched or mismatched the nouns. Degree of match between nouns and pictures (referen-
tial anchoring) and between their expected and actual spatial positions (spatial anchoring)
affected ﬁxations as well as judgments. We conclude that language induces incremental
processing of visual scenes, which in turn becomes susceptible to reasoning errors during
the language-meaning veriﬁcation process.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
1.1. Visual information processing
Language and vision are the primary means for accessing higher-order conceptual knowledge. We may capture the idea
that bees collect pollen, for instance, either from hearing that Bees collect pollen or from seeing a picture of bees collecting
pollen. Naturally, conceptual knowledge is retrieved more easily when linguistic and visual cues agree than when they are
contrasting or competing (e.g., Kashak & Glenberg, 2000; Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Stanﬁeld & Zwaan,
2001), although the mechanism by which cues combine is poorly understood, as there are important differences in the
way linguistic and visual information is represented and processed. In particular, language information is captured incre-
mentally as words gradually build up a sentence, whereas visual information is captured by ﬁxations in various directions
over a particular scene. Nevertheless, research using the visual-world paradigm (Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998;
Cooper, 1974; Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995) has determined
that visual information presented together with linguistic information is processed incrementally such that, when a spoken
word refers to an object in a visual display, attention is rapidly and automatically directed toward that object. These ﬁndings
support the idea that language guides visual processing and have fuelled research into how information from various sources
i.e. verbal, visual and world knowledge affects language comprehension and visual recognition. However, the consequences.
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In the current study, we explore whether incremental visual processing is vulnerable to unconscious cognitive biases that
may trigger reasoning errors.
1.2. Consequences of incremental processing: successful anticipation
There is a growing body of empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that language comprehension involves dynamic
perceptual simulations (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003; Kaschak et al., 2005; Zwaan, 2004) that can directly
affect visual perception. Dils and Boroditsky (2010), for instance, have shown that people’s interpretation of an ambiguous
ﬁgure e.g., a hawk ﬂying downward vs. a goose ﬂying upward is affected by previously hearing stories that describe physical
motion directed upwards or downwards. Further evidence that language guides visual processing comes from studies using
the visual-world paradigm. It was shown, in these studies, that visual processing in linguistic contexts mirrors language pro-
cessing and happens incrementally thus leading to several surprising effects, to which we now brieﬂy turn.
First, people are ready to instantly ﬁll in missing information in visual displays to make them ﬁt accompanying verbal
descriptions. As shown in Matlock (2004) and in Richardson and Matlock (2007), the eyes may scan the same drawing
e.g., a road amid palm trees differently, according to whether the accompanying sentence featured a ﬁctive-motion verb
(The road goes through the desert) or a static verb (The road is in the desert) and according to whether the terrain had been
previously described as being easy (The desert is ﬂat) or difﬁcult (The desert is hilly). Second, incremental processing may lead
people to anticipate a match between words and visual stimuli and identify a relevant target before being mentioned. As
shown in Altmann and Kamide (1999), participants who viewed a scene depicting a boy, a cake, and several toys were faster
to ﬁxate on the cake when hearing The boy will eat the cake rather than The boy will move the cake because the verb rapidly
evoked the knowledge that humans are likely to eat something edible. Finally, people are able to look at nothing in order to
conﬁrm a match e.g., they ﬁxate on a blank location if a relevant visual stimulus had previously occupied that region of space
(Altmann, 2004; Demarais & Cohen, 1998; Johansson, Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2006; Spivey & Geng, 2001).
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that anticipation, which is the landmark of incremental processing, is more likely
to affect visual cognition in linguistic contexts than otherwise. But exactly what are the effects of anticipation and thereby of
incremental processing? Research so far has been investigating cases where anticipation is successful i.e. cases in which vi-
sual and linguistic information match or at least are compatible with each other, as when the word ‘goose’ is used to describe
a hawk-like ﬁgure. The role of anticipation in examples like those above is to enrich or help disambiguate visual stimuli.
However, it is conceivable that incremental visual processing may not always beneﬁt cognitive processes. Anticipation might
fail in a series of mismatches between visual and linguistic information, as when the word ‘goose’ follows a mismatch and is
used to describe a chest of drawers, for instance. In the current paper, we explore the consequences of incremental visual
processing for language comprehension and basic reasoning by looking at both successful and unsuccessful cases of visual
stimuli anticipation.
1.3. Anticipation failure: the referential-anchoring hypothesis
Incremental processing in the visual-world paradigm relies on a successive series of reference types (matches or mis-
matches) between words and visual stimuli. Reference types are bound to inﬂuence each other for better or for worse
e.g., the anticipation of a match may succeed or fail. In particular, according to the anchoring hypothesis (e.g., Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), people are biased towards ﬁrst creating a reference point i.e. an ‘anchor’ and then adjusting to this refer-
ence when evaluating subsequent information. We carried out an eye-movements study of binary expressions i.e. coordinate
nouns to monitor the inﬂuence of the ﬁrst reference type on the second reference type. In particular, we recorded partici-
pants’ eye movements as they watched two pictures and listened to sentences featuring conjunctions (Nancy examined an
ant and a cloud) and disjunctions (Nancy examined an ant or a cloud). Their task was to decide whether conjunctions and dis-
junctions are true or false. The anchoring hypothesis predicts that participants should sometimes fail to anticipate the sec-
ond reference type when different from the anchor, that is, the ﬁrst reference type. For example, when hearing and ant or/and
a cloud, people may anticipate a match following a match (e.g., if they see an ant, they next expect to see a cloud) or a mis-
match following a mismatch (e.g., if they see something other than an ant, they next expect to see something other than a
cloud). As a result, they may fail to correctly identify the second visual stimulus and base their decision about the accuracy of
conjunctions and disjunctions on misperceptions.
1.4. Reasoning with conjunctions and disjunctions
Let us now brieﬂy review the requirements for correctly reasoning with conjunctions and disjunctions. In order to deter-
mine that a conjunction is true e.g., that it adequately describes a binary visual display, there must be a double match be-
tween conjuncts and visual stimuli. For example, Nancy examined an ant and a cloud is a true description if the visual display
features both an ant and a cloud. Nevertheless, anchoring effects may lead participants to unduly validate single-match con-
junctions. Likewise, disjunction is true when at least one disjunct matches a visual stimulus. For example, Nancy examined an
ant or a cloud is true if the visual display features an ant, a cloud, or both. However, anchoring effects may lead participants to
unduly invalidate single-match disjunctions.
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The main characteristic of speech is its irreversibility in time as it ﬂows uninterrupted from the past towards the future.
Similarly, writing in the Latin alphabet proceeds in a unique direction, from left to right. Moreover, the structures of spo-
ken and written language are very similar and consist of a single and continuous string of discrete elements such that,
within a word, each phoneme or letter precedes and follows a single phoneme or letter. We may therefore hypothesise
that incremental visual processing that is, visual scanning of a series of pictures in linguistic contexts or in other contexts
that encourage incremental processing may also proceed from left to right. Speciﬁcally, we advance the spatial-anchoring
hypothesis according to which incremental processing in the visual-world paradigm relies on a series of mappings of each
word in the speech stream onto a particular position in the visual stream, as follows. The ﬁrst-mentioned noun in the
speech stream is mapped onto the leftmost picture in a series of two or more, whereas the second-mentioned noun all
through the last-mentioned noun are mapped onto a position to the right of the leftmost position up to the rightmost
position.
The prerequisite of mapping the speech stream, which proceeds from the past towards the future, onto the visual
stream, which proceeds from left to right, is that the two streams be made compatible to each other. One way of
achieving compatibility is by converting the speech stream, which relies on temporal order, to the writing stream,
which relies on spatial order. Another way of achieving compatibility is through direct analogy, by taking the visual
stream as the source and the speech stream as the target. Careful investigation of the mechanisms by which compat-
ibility is achieved, however, lies beyond the scope of the present paper and remains a matter for future research. The
assumption we can make at this point, however, is that the mapping of the two streams onto each other is required by
processing limitations. It should be easier to keep track of two parallel-running streams when they are being linked to
each other than when they are being kept separate. Speciﬁcally, we predict that participants should start scanning the
two pictures from left to right and thus match the ﬁrst noun in the sentence to the leftmost picture and the second
noun in the sentence to the rightmost picture. Processing difﬁculties and even reasoning errors can be expected
in cases where the order in which the pictures are mentioned mismatches the order in which the pictures are visu-
ally scanned – for example, in cases where the ﬁrst noun in the sentence matches the rightmost picture in the visual
scene.1.6. Does incremental processing affect meaning retrieval?
The consequences of incremental processing of visual stimuli are unlikely to target the process of meaning retrieval that
is, participants should have no difﬁculty accessing the meaning of conjunctions and disjunctions as coordination sentences
unfold. Meaning retrieval is an essentially predictive process and therefore participants are likely to gain access to the mean-
ing of the two nouns and to the relationship between them in coordination sentences before identifying the pictures and
thus before attempting to map this information onto the visual input. The language-primacy assumption in the visual-world
paradigm has been repeatedly veriﬁed in experimental studies reporting anticipation of linguistic and visual matching ef-
fects, as detailed earlier. In order to determine whether incremental visual processing indeed allows access to language
meaning e.g., to the rules governing the correct use of conjunctions and disjunctions and thus whether it only affects the
rule-implementation process, we varied the coordinator linking the two nouns to be either a conjunction (and) or a disjunc-
tion (or). We expect to determine through a whole set of measurements i.e. response latency, response accuracy, probability
of ﬁxating the two pictures while hearing the second noun, and ﬁrst-saccade latency to the second noun, that there are dif-
ferences in processing conjunction vs. disjunction trials that are orthogonal to accuracy rates obtained for same vs. different-
anchor trials or for left-to-right vs. right-to-left trials.
To summarize, we expect to observe two consequences of language-induced incremental processing in our experimental
study. The ﬁrst consequence concerns the degree of match between visual input and the identity of the two nouns in the
sentence. We are particularly interested in conditions where one of the nouns mismatches one of the pictures to determine
whether measurements at the second noun are inﬂuenced by whether the ﬁrst noun had been a match or a mismatch. The
referential-anchoring hypothesis predicts that attention will target a particular picture while hearing the second noun only
in cases where the ﬁrst noun had already matched one of the two pictures in the binary visual display. For example, a (mis)-
match following a match should be ﬁxated on signiﬁcantly more than a (mis)match following a mismatch. This may result in
lower response-accuracy rates or in longer response latencies. The second consequence concerns the degree of match be-
tween visual input and the spatial mapping of the two nouns in the sentence. We expect more ﬁxations on the picture cor-
responding to the second noun when it follows a ﬁrst noun matching a picture to the right of the visual display than when it
follows a ﬁrst noun matching a left-side picture. Based on our spatial-anchoring hypothesis, according to which pictures are
mapped onto a visual stream running from left to right, we anticipate that participants should start visual scanning with the
leftmost picture and expect the second picture to be displayed towards the right. We thus predict more ﬁxations on mis-
placed pictures when the second nounmatches a picture to the left than a picture to the right. Misplacements may also affect
response-accuracy or response-latency results. We further predict a difference in saccade-latency to the second noun in con-
junction vs. disjunction trials, which would indicate that participants can gain early access to the meanings of the two
coordinators.
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1.7.1. Participants
Twenty-four volunteering university students participated in the experiment in exchange for 15 AUD. They were all na-
tive speakers of English and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing.
1.7.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Eye movements were recorded by an Eye Link 1000 remote eye-tracker sampling at 500 Hz from the right eye. Visual
stimuli consisted of four sets of 24 picture pairs each = 96 picture pairs selected frommonochrome versions of images devel-
oped by Rossion and Pourtois (2004) based on a standardized set of line drawings of familiar objects (Snodgrass & Vander-
wart, 1980), as seen in Fig. 1. Each set of visual stimuli corresponded to one of four experimental conditions. There were thus
24 different visual displays (i.e. both pictures in the display were presented only one time during the whole 96 trials) for
each of the four possible combinations of matching and mismatching correspondences between words and visual stimuli,
that is, the match + match (MM), the mismatch + match (mM), the match + mismatch (Mm) and the mismatch + mismatch
(mm) condition. Each set of 24 picture pairs was associated to two sets of spoken stimuli presented through stereo loud-
speakers, one featuring conjunctions, and the other disjunctions e.g., Nancy examined an ant and (or) a cloud. Further, we con-
trolled the order of the pictures in the display such that half of the visual stimuli matched the nouns mentioned in the
sentence in the left-to-right order and the other half in the right-to-left order. Nouns in spoken sentences across the four
conditions were matched to each other in length (number of phonemes) and in lexical frequency estimated from log-trans-
formed frequency counts reported in the SUBTLEXUS corpus (Brysbaert & New, 2009). Pictures corresponding to nouns across
the four conditions were also matched to each other along three dimensions i.e. image agreement, familiarity, and complex-
ity (cf. Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980).
Sentences were recorded in randomized order by a male native speaker of English. Markers were placed in each speech
ﬁle, allowing us to identify the onset and offset of the subject, verb, ﬁrst determiner, ﬁrst noun, connective, second deter-
miner, and second noun as follows: Nancy |examined |an|ant |or|a|cloud|. We ensured that the duration of the second noun
(e.g., cloud) in speech ﬁles was similar across conditions (all p values >0.05).
1.7.3. Design and procedure
The experiment consisted of six practice trials followed by 96 experimental trials for each of the two lists we constructed.
Each participant saw a visual display once and heard either a conjunction or a disjunction sentence (Latin-square design).
The presentation order of the stimuli was randomized in the same fashion across both lists. Participants were informed that
two matches between nouns and pictures were required for the validation of conjunction trials and that a single match was
sufﬁcient for the validation of disjunction trials. They were further informed that they were free to decide whether to val-
idate or invalidate disjunction trials featuring two matches. We thereby attempted to balance the experimental design and
have four conditions in which participants may give a ‘yes’ answer (MM conjunction trials andMM,Mm, andmM, disjunction
trials) and four conditions in which participants may give a ‘no’ answer (mM, Mm, and mm conjunction trials and mm
disjunction trials), without imposing constraints on MM disjunction interpretation that might inﬂuence the output. Indeed,
previous reports in literature have identiﬁed two robust groups of respondents, namely those who spontaneously validateFig. 1. Example stimuli displayed in the left-to-right order (upper panels) and in the right-to-left order (lower panels) for theMM,mM, andMm conditions.
Participants viewed a visual scene (e.g., containing an ant and a cloud) and heard Nancy examined an ant and a cloud or Nancy examined an ant or a cloud.
Visual scenes in the mm condition (not shown) featured two pictures, neither of which matched the nouns mentioned in the sentence.
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appear unconventional, especially that different answers are expected for a particular condition (e.g.,mM orMm) in conjunc-
tion vs. disjunction trials. Nevertheless, trials will not be identical, as sentences accompanying a visual display containing
only one match, for instance, will feature either a conjunction or a disjunction word. Moreover, participants need not only
determine whether the nouns mentioned are matching any of the pictures in the visual scene, but further attend to the
meaning of the coordinator linking the nouns and thus perform a reasoning task.
Participants were seated at a comfortable distance from the computer screen. At the start of the experiment, we per-
formed a nine-point calibration and validation procedure, which was monitored and adjusted as necessary after the training
phase. Participants were instructed to attend carefully to the stimuli, and decide whether each sentence could match the
visual display by pressing the right button for a ‘yes’ answer, and the left button for a ‘no’ answer (counterbalanced). The
structure of a trial was as follows. First, a ﬁxation dot appeared in the centre of the screen, followed by a pair of images. After
1500 ms, a spoken sentence was presented. The objects remained onscreen until response.
2. Results and discussion
We recorded response accuracy and response latency for all trials. The distinction between the ﬁrst and the second object,
however, does not apply inmm trials, and hence we reported the probability of ﬁxating the pictures while hearing the second
noun and the ﬁrst-saccade latency to the second picture after second-noun onset only for the remaining trials (MM, mM,
Mm). We also included ‘order’ as a supplementary factor when analysing results for each condition under each measurement
in these trials. We excluded responses for which saccade latencies were shorter than 80 ms or longer than 1500 ms (less than
1% of the trials).
2.1. Response accuracy
We coded correct responses as ‘1’ and incorrect responses as ‘0’. By convention, ‘yes’ responses in MM disjunction trials
were coded as ‘correct’, although both responses are logically valid. The left panel in Fig. 2 shows the validation patterns
across trials. We carried out a 2 (connective: and vs. or)  4 (condition:MM vs.mM vs.Mm vs.mm) ANOVA and found a main
effect of condition, F (3, 21) = 5.43, p = .006, g2P ¼ :437, showing that participants validated signiﬁcantly more trials in themm
condition than in any of the remaining conditions (MM,mM, andMm). This ﬁnding is particularly important and supports the
idea that the mm condition is a suitable criterion by which to measure performance in the remaining conditions. We also
found an effect of connective, F (1, 23) = 3.59, p = .007, g2P ¼ :278, further qualiﬁed by an interaction between condition
and connective, F (3, 21) = 3.59, p = .031, g2P ¼ :339. In particular, there were signiﬁcantly higher rates of accuracy in
conjunction trials than in disjunction trials in the MM condition, F (1, 23) = 4.97, p = .036, g2P ¼ :178, which is not surprising,
considering that some participants interpreted disjunction exclusively and hence invalidated MM disjunction trials.
We further carried out analyses for each of the four conditions, including ‘order’ as a factor. A 2 (connective: and vs.
or)  2 (order: left-to-right vs. right-to-left) ANOVA overMM trials showed no effect of order (p = .664) and no interaction be-
tween factors (p = .185). Similar results obtained for Mm trials; there was no effect of order (p = .660) and no interaction be-
tween factors (p = .403). The 2  2 ANOVA over mM trials, however, revealed a main effect of order, F (1, 23) = 5.86, p = .024,
g2P ¼ :203, with higher validation rates of left-to-right trials compared to right-to-left trials. We may infer that the mM con-
dition is the most susceptible to incrementality effects, both anticipation-related and mapping-related.
2.2. Response latency
As seen in the right panel of Fig. 2, the response latency data agree with the response accuracy data. The 2 (connective:
and vs. or)  4 (condition: MM vs. mM vs. Mm vs. mm) ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition, F (3, 21) = 4.02, p = .011,Fig. 2. The left panel shows the percentage of correct answers as a function of connective type (and, or) and condition (MM, Mm, mM, mm). By convention,
we coded ‘yes’ responses as ‘correct’ and ‘no’ responses as ‘incorrect’ in the MM disjunction condition. The right panel shows response latencies across
conditions (ms). Both panels indicate show that performance in mixed conditions (mM and Mm trials) is impaired compared to performance in the mm
condition, which is the fastest and most accurate.
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effect of connective, F (1, 23) = 24.28, p < .001, g2P ¼ :514, with faster responses in conjunction trials than in disjunction trials.
The effect was further qualiﬁed by an interaction between condition and connective, F (3, 21) = 11.21, p < .001, g2P ¼ :616,
such that processing was signiﬁcantly faster in conjunction trials than in disjunction trials in the MM condition, F
(1, 23) = 45.22, p < .001, g2P ¼ :663, and in the mm condition, F (1, 23) = 11.72, p = .002, g2P ¼ :338. The ﬁndings suggest that
participants were trying to decide on whether to accept an inclusive interpretation of disjunction or not, and hence whether
to validate or invalidate disjunction trials where both pictures mentioned in the spoken sentences were present.
A 2 (connective: and vs. or)  2 (order: left-to-right vs. right-to-left) ANOVA over MM trials revealed an interaction be-
tween factors, F (1, 23) = 19.49, p < .001, g2P ¼ :459, such that faster responses obtained for left-to-right than for right-to-left
conjunction trials (F (1, 23) = 8.20, p = .009, g2P ¼ :263) and for right-to-left than for left-to-right disjunction trials (F
(1, 23) = 11.68, p < .002, g2P ¼ :337). These results seem surprising but can be readily explained if we considered the possibil-
ity that some participants may have stopped processing the second matching picture and decided that sufﬁcient evidence
was available (i.e., the ﬁrst match) for them to respond in disjunction trials. This explanation is further supported by re-
sponse-accuracy data showing that a signiﬁcant proportion of participants invalidated MM trials. The 2  2 ANOVA over
mM trials showed no effect of order (p = .479) and no interaction between factors (p = .267). Similarly, the 2  2 ANOVA over
Mm trials showed no effect of order (p = .977) and no interaction (p = .990).
2.3. Probability of ﬁxating the pictures while hearing the second noun
The upper panels in Fig. 3 show the probability of ﬁxating the pictures while hearing the second noun. We compared the
probability of ﬁxating the ﬁrst and second picture in a 2 (connective: and vs. or)  3 (condition:MM vs.mM vs.Mm)  2 (pic-
ture: ﬁrst vs. second) ANOVA. We observed a main effect of condition, F (2, 22) = 7.24, p = .004, g2P ¼ :397, with signiﬁcantly
more ﬁxations in the mM condition than in either the MM or the Mm conditions. Overall, the second picture was ﬁxated on
more than the ﬁrst picture, F (1, 23) = 222.39, p < .001, g2P ¼ :908, which would seem to conﬁrm previous ﬁndings in litera-
ture that the eyes target the object that is being mentioned. If this explanation may hold for results during the second noun
in MM and mM trials, it must be abandoned once we consider the results obtained during the second noun in Mm trials. We
found that the eyes ﬁxated on the ‘other’ picture even when it mismatched the second noun. We interpret these results as
evidence in support of the anchoring hypothesis: Participants anticipated another match to follow the ﬁrst match inMm tri-
als, as they did inMM trials, and hence they were prepared to ﬁxate on the matching picture. The effect of picture was further
qualiﬁed by an interaction between factors, F (2, 22) = 29.18, p < .001, g2P ¼ :726. Planned comparisons showed that there
were more ﬁxations on the second picture in MM trials than in mM trials or in Mm trials and in Mm than in mM trials. Con-Fig. 3. The upper panels show the probability of ﬁxating the two pictures while hearing the second noun. Note that the second picture is ﬁxated on more
than the ﬁrst picture in MM and Mm trials, but not in mM trials, as predicted by the anchoring hypothesis. The lower panels show the time, from second-
noun onset, of launching a ﬁrst saccade to the second picture. Examples illustrate the MM, mM, and Mm conditions; the notions of (mis)matching pictures
and spatial order of the pictures do not apply in the mm condition.
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mM than in Mm trials. These ﬁndings further support the anchoring hypothesis.
A 2 (connective: and vs. or)  2 (picture: ﬁrst vs. second)  2 (order: left-to-right vs. right-to-left) ANOVA over MM trials
revealed a main effect of order, F (1, 23) = 6.18, p = .021, g2P ¼ :212, with more ﬁxations in right-to-left than in left-to-right
trials while hearing the second noun. We also observed an interaction between order and picture, F (1, 23) = 7.24, p = .013,
g2P ¼ :240, with more ﬁxations on the ﬁrst picture in right-to-left than in left-to-right trials while hearing the second noun, F
(1, 23) = 8.01, p = .009, g2P ¼ :258; order did not inﬂuence signiﬁcantly ﬁxations on the second picture (p = .080). These results
support the spatial-order hypothesis according to which participants expect matching objects to be placed in the left-to-
right order in a visual scene. Participants would tend to move their eyes towards the right when matching the second noun
to the second picture. Their ﬁxating on the ﬁrst picture placed towards the right while hearing the second noun suggests that
their expectations for the second matching object to be placed in that position have not been met.
The 2  2  2 ANOVA over mM trials revealed an interaction between picture and order, F (1, 23) = 20.85, p < .001,
g2P ¼ :476, as follows. In left-to-right trials (that is, when the matching picture was placed to the right), the second (match-
ing) picture was ﬁxated on more than the ﬁrst (mismatching) picture, whereas in right-to-left trials, the ﬁrst picture was
ﬁxated on more than the second while hearing the second noun. The results suggest that, whereas participants had no
difﬁculty in ﬁxating on the matching picture when placed in the anticipated position (to the right in left-to-right trials),
they failed to ﬁxate on the matching picture when misplaced (to the left in right-to-left trials) and ﬁxated on the mismatch-
ing picture instead because it was placed in the anticipated position for verifying the second reference type, namely to the
right.
As forMm trials, the 2  2  2 ANOVA revealed a main effect of order, F (1, 23) = 36.73, p < .001, g2P ¼ :615, with more ﬁx-
ations in right-to-left trials than in left-to-right trials. There was also an interaction between order and picture, F
(1, 23) = 18.71, p < .001, g2P ¼ :449, such that there were more ﬁxations on the ﬁrst picture in right-to-left trials than in
left-to-right trials, but there was no difference between the two spatial orders for the second picture (p = .158). The results
can be accounted for by the spatial-order hypothesis as reﬂecting participants’ failed expectations to start visual scanning at
the left and hence ﬁnd the ﬁrst (matching) picture at the left side of the visual display.
2.4. First-saccade latency to the second picture following second-noun onset
The lower panels in Fig. 3 show the latencies of ﬁrst saccades to the second picture following the onset of the second
noun. A three (condition: MM vs. mM vs. Mm)  2 (connective: and vs. or) revealed a main effect of condition, F
(2, 22) = 10.48, p = .001, g2P ¼ :583, with ﬁrst saccades to the second object launched later in theMM condition than in either
the mM or the Mm conditions, and in the Mm than in the mM condition. We may attribute these effects to participants’ dif-
ﬁculty with constructing overall sentence meaning by ﬁnding relevant links between matching nouns. Discarding the mean-
ing of mismatching nouns appears to be an effortless process – a result conﬁrmed by optimal accuracy ratings and overall
latency results obtained for mm trials, as detailed above. We also found an effect of connective, F (1, 23) = 20.168, p < .001,
g2P ¼ :558, with saccades launched later in disjunction trials than in conjunction trials. These results are unsurprising, con-
sidering that disjunction is arguably more complex a concept than conjunction is. They also agree with our prediction that
participants would be able to gain early access to the meaning of the two coordinators (i.e. of conjunction- vs. disjunction
words) and process the input accordingly.
A two (connective: and vs. or)  2 (order: left-to-right vs. right-to-left) ANOVA over MM trials showed no effect of order
(p = .931) and no interaction between factors (p = .254). The same analysis over mM trials revealed a marginally signiﬁcant
interaction between connective and order, F (1, 23) = 3.90, p = .061, g2P ¼ :157, with ﬁrst saccades to the second picture
launched later in right-to-left than in left-to-right conjunction trials, F (1, 23) = 4.39, p = .048, g2P ¼ :173; there was no signif-
icant difference in disjunction trials (p = .535). The effect may be explained based on spatial order as well as on the assump-
tion that participants are able to gain early access to coordinator meaning, as follows. Since, after identifying a mismatch,
participants anticipated conjunction to be invalid, they were less motivated to rapidly ﬁnd a match and thus shift their gaze
towards the second picture by ﬁghting their way against the left-to-right visual stream. In contrast, the effort was well war-
ranted in disjunction trials where one match is sufﬁcient for validating the trials. The 2  2 ANOVA over Mm trials only re-
vealed a marginally signiﬁcant interaction between connective and order, F (1, 23) = 3.97, p = .069, g2P ¼ :249, such that
saccades to the second picture were launched later in right-to left than in left-to-right disjunction trials, F (1, 23) = 5.88,
p = .032, g2P ¼ :329; there was no signiﬁcant difference between the two orders in conjunction trials (p = .534). As for the pre-
vious condition, we may assume that participants were satisﬁed with a single match in disjunction trials and hence were less
motivated to go against the visual stream in launching saccades to the second picture to ﬁnd another match. In contrast, the
effort was absolutely necessary in conjunction trials, as validation was pending.
3. Sentence-plausibility study
We carried out a calibration study to control for the possibility that sentence plausibility might have affected the results.
Thirty volunteering university students participated in the experiment, in return for course credit. They were presented with
the same conjunction and disjunction sentences used in the eye-tracking study in randomized order. We asked participants
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being ‘‘very unlikely’’ and 7 being ‘‘very likely). Answers from 7 participants were discarded, as they reported not having
grown up in an English-speaking region. For conjunction trials, the mean ratings were 4.49 (SD = 1.10) in the Mm condition,
4.29 (SD = 1.31) in the mM condition, 4.06 (SD = 1.21) in the MM condition, and 4.06 (SD = 1.27) in the mm condition. For
disjunction trials, the mean ratings were 4.56 (SD = 1.07) in the Mm condition, 4.37 (SD = 1.20) in the mM condition, 4.14
(SD = 1.11) in the MM condition, and 4.25 (SD = 1.01) in the mm condition. We carried out a regression analysis of the results
across items from the calibration study together with the results across items from the eye-tracking study. Table 1 presents a
summary of the main statistics. We were unable to analyse response accuracy results for mm disjunction trials because re-
sponses were constant (at ceiling). We can observe that none of the remaining p-values reached signiﬁcance, suggesting that
sentence plausibility did not affect the effects reported in our eye-tracking study (i.e., response accuracy, response latency,
probability of ﬁxating the pictures, and ﬁrst-saccade latency to the second picture).
4. General discussion
In the current study, we showed that language induces incremental visual processing, which in turn triggers reasoning
errors during the language-meaning veriﬁcation process. We identiﬁed two consequences of incremental processing, both
of which are amenable to an explanation in terms of anchoring effects (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
The ﬁrst consequence relates to anticipating similar reference types, thus anticipating matches between linguistic and
visual stimuli to follow matches and mismatches between these stimuli to follow mismatches. We found that participants
anchored their expectations relating to upcoming reference types in the most recent reference type. Indeed, there were low-
er rates of response accuracy and higher rates of response latency in mixed trials (mM and Mm) compared to simple trials
(mm), effects that we attribute not to a lack of knowledge or proper access to relevant language/reasoning rules, but to an
unconscious anticipation failure of the evidence available that is, the visual stimuli needed to verify the rules. Further effects
in mixed trials will be discussed directly.
The second consequence of incremental processing of visual stimuli relates to anticipating a particular mapping of the
speech stream onto the visual stream. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst of two nouns in a coordination sentence should correspond to
a left-side picture in a visual scene and the second noun to a right-side picture. We found that participants anchored each
correspondence type between linguistic and visual stimuli to a particular position in the visual scene. Spatial-anchoring ef-
fects targeted all conditions containing at least one match between linguistic and visual stimuli and hence mixed trials (mM
and Mm) as well as MM trials. Indeed, we found lower rates of response accuracy in right-to-left than in left-to-right mM
trials and greater response latencies in right-to-left than in left-to-right MM trials.
The visual-world paradigm is particularly suited to testing the consequences of incremental visual processing, as it
allowed us to observe a link between lower-accuracy responses in mixed conditions and high ﬁxation probabilities forTable 1
Regression-analysis results using sentence-plausibility ratings as predictors of performance across conditions. Non-signiﬁcant p-values indicate that sentence
plausibility did not affect performance.
R2 F (1, 22) p-Value
AND OR AND OR AND OR
Response accuracy
mm .004 – .083 – .776 –
MM .032 .020 .732 .442 .401 .513
mM .066 .063 1.54 .089 .226 .769
Mm .006 .005 .124 .106 .728 .748
Response latency
mm .004 .008 .086 .173 .772 .681
MM .001 .026 .023 .577 .881 .455
mM .005 .215 .117 1.06 .735 .313
Mm .009 .000 .193 .006 .664 .940
First-saccade latency (object 2)
MM .074 .072 1.68 1.71 .208 .204
mM .020 .113 .450 2.79 .509 .109
Mm .000 .000 .002 .007 .967 .935
Fixation probability (object 1)
MM .002 .000 .034 .002 .855 .964
mM .043 .033 .979 .752 .333 .395
Mm .047 .028 1.08 .638 .308 .433
Fixation probability (object 2)
MM .057 .002 1.32 .047 .263 .831
mM .000 .150 .005 3.86 .943 .062
Mm .159 .008 4.16 .170 .053 .684
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against previous ﬁndings in literature that the eyes should ﬁxate on matching stimuli more than on mismatching stimuli, but
are in accord with the referential-anchoring hypothesis that participants should not ﬁxate on a picture (whether a match or a
mismatch) unless it follows a match. As for the match between pictures and spatial order, the visual-world paradigm al-
lowed us to clearly establish that visual scanning is oriented from left to right. Spatial anchoring resulted in more ﬁxations
on pictures in the right-to-left order than in the left-to-right order both in MM as well as in mM and Mm conditions.
Importantly, we found that incremental visual processing spared meaning retrieval, allowing us to conclude that anchor-
ing affects the sentence-meaning veriﬁcation process. In particular, saccades to the second picture were launched later in
disjunction trials than in conjunction trials, especially in the MM condition. The results mirror the response-latency data
i.e. participants took longer to process disjunction trials than conjunction trials and it is interesting to observe that partic-
ipants were able to make the distinction early on i.e. before second-noun offset. We may hypothesise that people’s represen-
tation of conjunctions and disjunctions is based on their experience with coordination situations. For example, because
people are often prompted to select both items mentioned when hearing a conjunction (e.g., Have a cup of coffee and a bis-
cuit!), they are likely to represent conjunction as a single cognitive object (cf. Link, 1983). Likewise, because people are often
prompted to choose between alternatives when hearing a disjunction (cf. Braine & Rumain, 1981; Fillenbaum, 1974; Simons,
2001) they are likely to represent disjunction (e.g., Have a biscuit or a fruit!) as two cognitive objects. Further, if we assume an
analogy with ﬁndings from the visual-processing literature that there is no cost involved in shifting attention between object
parts but that there is a cost in shifting attention between objects (Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994; Lamy & Egeth, 2002), we may
see why the eyes switch easier that is, earlier from the ﬁrst to the second picture in conjunction trials than in disjunction
trials. Our assumption is warranted by previous ﬁndings by Matlock (2004) and by Richardson and Matlock (2007) among
others, that eye movements are modulated by the mental representations which are currently active, thus triggered by lan-
guage descriptions.
Our ﬁndings further shed light on results that have been occasionally reported in previous studies on coordination, espe-
cially in the developmental literature, but have received only tentative explanations. Paris (1973) as well as Braine and Ru-
main (1981), for instance, investigated disjunction sentences and found very low rates of correct responses to mM and Mm
trials in children and adults. More recently, in a statement-picture veriﬁcation task with adults, Chevallier et al. (2008) re-
ported a moderate drop in correct percentages for mixed conditions (Mm andmM) compared tomm conditions by at most 9%
for conjunction- and 10% for disjunction trials. These results are comparable with our own - a drop of up to 9% in conjunction
trials and of 8% in disjunction trials. However, in a study with typically-developing and autistic children, Chevallier, Wilson,
Happé, and Noveck (2010) reported a dramatic drop in ‘correct’ responses (up to 58%) for disjunction trials but only a very
modest drop (1%) for conjunction trials. We therefore suggest that there are two mechanisms at work when reasoning with
coordinators, of which one concerns the meaning-assignment process that is, disjunction interpretation, and the other the
meaning-veriﬁcation process that is, anchoring. We further believe that task details are important for triggering rather
one or both mechanisms. Recall that we only found a signiﬁcant difference in response accuracy between theMM and either
the Mm or the mM condition for conjunction trials. However, we maintained that anchoring affected all trials because accu-
racy rates in the MM condition were signiﬁcantly lower for disjunction trials compared to conjunction trials. The difference
may be due to interpretation factors independent of cognitive-biasing effects.
Finally, we would like to consider the larger implications of our main ﬁnding that incremental processing is a source of
error for domains other than language. We may hypothesise that speech and spelling errors are easily detectable because
language offers a straightforward categorization mechanism. For instance, a variety of cars of various brands, colours, and
dimensions can be simply labelled as ‘car’, whereas the visual system needs to pack a lot of category-related information
to conceptualize a percept. Although visual perception happens much faster than language processing, the cognitive load
associated with visual cognition is certainly greater. Even simple cognitive operations over visual percepts e.g., sequence for-
mation or comparisons require some form of categorization or tagging, making the visual system particularly susceptible to
errors. This may be the reason why language has long been the preferred medium of expressing thought-related processes.5. Conclusions
Language-guided visual processing happens incrementally and therefore is susceptible both to anticipation success and to
anticipation failure. The present study is the ﬁrst to directly investigate the effects of anticipation on language comprehen-
sion and basic reasoning. We determined that, whereas people could easily access language meaning (of conjunctions vs.
disjunctions) when presented with both visual- and linguistic information, their success rates with verifying this meaning
cannot be optimal unless information types match, or at least are compatible with each other. The upshot of our ﬁnding
is that anticipation itself is a form of cognitive bias that, like other unconscious phenomena, beneﬁts information processing
when it operates with extremely stable labels.
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